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Legislative Alternatives to Tax Shelters
In recent years, a growing concern has developed about the availability of
tax avoidance devices that allow the high-income taxpayer to eliminate or
substantially reduce his income tax ability. "Tax shelter" is the term
usually ascribed to an investment or business which enables the taxpayer to
reduce the amount of tax he would normally owe on his non-tax shelter
income.
Various tax incentives currently exist in our tax system;' their purpose is
to encourage investment in the areas where the incentives exist, thereby
altering the allocation of resources so as to improve economic efficiency. 2
Businesses and investments entered into primarily to obtain tax shelter
benefits, however, represent a misuse of the tax incentives and prevent tax
incentives from fulfilling their intended function in our tax system. It has
been argued that most tax shelters, rather than improve economic efficiency,
distort property values and construction costs, interfere with the efficient
allocation of resources, and result in economically unsound investments. 3
Also, the equity of the tax system is severely impaired by tax shelters.
Reduction or elimination of tax liability through tax shelters increases the
tax burden of those who are not wealthy enough either to invest in tax
avoidance schemes or benefit from them. Moreover, many of the benefits
provided by the tax incentive provisions do not go to those actively involved
in the activities intended to be aided by the incentives. 4 Instead, the tax
benefits flow to individuals who take no active part in the operation and who
are only interested in reducing their taxable income. 5 Tax incentives, there-
fore, frequently are used by a substantial number of taxpayers who were not
intended to be benefitted by the incentives, but who are taking advantage of
the tax law to the detriment of the nation and the State of California.
Attempts to correct the abuses associated with tax shelters have been
made by California and the federal government. Prior to 1976, the last major
reform to federal law was the Tax Reform Act of 1969.6 It added many of
1. See Aaron, Inventory of Existing Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX INCENTIVES 39
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Aaron].
2. Id. at 39-40.
3. [1976] 17 SPECIAL STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 13.
4. For example, the owner of a limited partnership interest in a farming tax shelter does
not actively participate in the farming enterprise, but he benefits from the tax provisions that
allow current deductibility of development and raising costs and that provide for accelerated
depreciation on the orchard and grove.
5. See McDaniel, Tax Reform and The Revenue Act of 1971: Lesions, Lagniappes, and
Lessons, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 813, 822-26 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McDaniel].
6. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 8
the existing provisions that attempt to control the abuses of tax shelters. 7
California followed the federal lead and amended its tax code to conform to
the revised federal law. 8 Those attempts, however, have not been successful
in remedying the abuses.
The attempts at tax reform are continuing and have resulted in the passage
by Congress of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 [the Act]. 9 This legislation
contains various provisions that are intended to reduce the opportunities for
tax avoidance. 10 The House and the Senate took different approaches to the
problem, but the Act represents the Senate approach. The House relied on a
limitation on artificial losses provision, 11 whereas the Senate proposed
modifications to the minimum and maximum tax provisions, inclusion of an
"at risk" limitation on losses and a section aimed at farming syndicates, and
strengthened depreciation recapture rules.'1 An examination of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and the original bill passed by the House would present
the various alternatives to the tax shelter problem that are available to
California.
This comment will examine the general nature of real estate and farming
tax shelters and analyze the legislative alternatives that are available to
California. While this comment will deal with the problems inherent in the
California income tax scheme, an analysis of federal tax law and reform is
instructive because California law in the tax field is significantly influenced
by federal law. Although California is not required to conform to federal tax
law, 13 the California Legislature has followed the federal lead many times
and amended California law to conform to the revised federal law in order to
promote consistency in the tax laws. 14 Thus an examination of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and the original bill passed by the House will be
instructive. This analysis will conclude with a recommendation that changes
be made in the tax law of California in order to eliminate some of the current
abuses of our tax system.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TAX SHELTERS
Tax shelters have three basic characteristics: (1) deferral; (2) conversion;
7. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 made several changes in the Internal Revenue Code. The
1969 amendments include: (1) Section 1251 which deals with the recapture of previously
deducted farm losses; (2) Section 1252 which requires that depreciation taken on farm improve-
ments be recaptured; (3) Section 278 which mandates that the taxpayer capitalize the develop-
ment costs of certain fruit groves; and (4) Sections 1245 and 1250 which are concerned with the
recapture of depreciation taken on real and personal property.
8. E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§18212-18213 amended, CAL. STATS. 1st Ex. Sess.
1971, C.1, §§117, 118, effective December 8, 1976.
9. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
10. 122 CONG. REc. S16,013 (Sept. 16, 1976) (remarks of Senator Long).
11. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101 (1975).
12. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
13. See Coast Elevator Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 44 Cal. App. 3d 576, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (1975).
14. E.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§18200-18219.
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and (3) leverage.15 An examination of each characteristic is essential to an
understanding of the legislative alternatives.
A. Deferral
Deferral refers to the shifting of income tax liability for income received
in a current period to a later tax period.16 Deferral commonly occurs where
an investor is involved in an activity which uses the cash basis of account-
ing17 and is allowed to accelerate certain deductions such as depreciation. 18
The amount representing the accelerated portion of the depreciation deduc-
tion may result in losses for the current tax period that reduce his taxable
income and his tax liability. Taxation of the income from the investment is
deferred to a later period when the asset being depreciated is sold or
otherwise disposed of, or when the investment is producing income and the
offsetting deductions have been used up. Thus tax otherwise payable during
the current taxable year is deferred to a later period. 19
The benefit provided to the taxpayer is essentially an interest-free loan of
the tax dollars saved in the year of deferral.2 0 The magnitude of the deferral
benefit depends on the degree of acceleration of the deduction and the
investor's tax bracket.21 The value of deferral increases as the investor's tax
bracket increases because the amount of taxes deferred also increases. 22
B. Conversion
Conversion refers to the situation in which deductions representing the
cost of an asset are used to reduce ordinary income, but any profit on the
sale of that asset is taxed as a capital gain.23 Since the effective rate of tax on
a capital gain is less than the rate applied to ordinary income, the taxpayer is
required to repay only part of the amount previously deferred. Thus, the
taxpayer not only receives the benefits of an interest-free loan from the
government, but he also has to repay only part of the loan.24
The depreciation recapture rules 25 limit the operation of conversion. On
15. S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 108 (1973) (hereinafter cited as SURREY].
16. E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ. FEDERALINCOME TAXATION 1049 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as GRISWOLD & GRAETZ].
17. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 228 (1973):
Under the cash method receipts and income items are reported in the year received
and deductions and credits in the year paid.
18. I.R.C. §167; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17208-17210.
19. See generally GRISWOLD & GRAETZ, supra note 16, at 1049-50.
20. GRISWOLD & GRAETZ, supra note 16, at 1049.
21. SURREY, supra note 15, at 111.
22. McKee, The Real Estate Tax Shelter: A Computerized Expose, 57 VA. L. REV. 521,
537 (1971) [hereinafter cited as McKee].
23. GRISWOLD & GRAETZ, supra note 16, at 1049.
24. McDaniel, supra note 5, at 823.
25. I.R.C. §§1245, 1250; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§18211, 18212-18218. Depreciation
recapture refers to the treatment accorded the amount deducted as depreciation in excess of
that available using the straight-line method when the asset being depreciated is disposed of.
The amount of gain that is normally treated as capital gain is characterized as ordinary income
to the extent the depreciation is recaptured.
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the disposition of a depreciated asset, the law provides that the gain will be
treated as ordinary income to the extent of the accelerated depreciation
previously taken on the asset. Of course, the greater the time period between
the initial deferral and the later sale, the less significant depreciation recap-
ture becomes. 26 Since the measure of the benefit of deferral is the present
value of the amount of taxes deferred, whether the tax treatment is ordinary
or capital gain would be of little importance after ten or 15 years of
deferral. 27
An example of the operation of conversion is where an asset on which
accelerated depreciation has been taken is later sold and the proceeds are
taxed as a capital gain. There has been a conversion of deductions against
ordinary income into capital gain. The scope of the recapture rules will limit
the amount subject to the favorable capital gain treatment.
C. Leverage
Leverage is basically the use of borrowed money in an investment by a
taxpayer. Usually the amount of borrowed money will exceed the taxpayer's
equity in the investment. 28 Thus by using debt financing the taxpayer can
purchase property worth many more times his initial investment. As an
additional advantage to the use of leverage, the taxpayer has more funds
available for other investments.
The tax benefit that results from leverage is caused by the manner in
which the tax system treats borrowed funds and the repayment of those
funds. Borrowed funds are included in the cost of an asset and its depreci-
able basis to the same extent as the taxpayer's own funds. 29 Thus, the
individual can depreciate the portion of the asset's cost represented by
borrowed funds in addition to the portion comprised of his personal funds. 30
Moreover, the taxpayer is allowed to deduct the interest on the loan paid by
him. 31 Thus the investor can not only take deductions for the interest paid on
the loan, but he can also take deductions for accelerated depreciation
calculated on a basis which includes the amount of the loan.
The characteristics of tax shelters can be combined for even greater tax
savings. For example, the benefits of deferral can be magnified significantly
through the use of leverage, in that the amount that can be ultimately
deferred can be greater than the taxpayer's investment.32 The resulting tax
26. SURREY, supra note 15, at 116.
27. Id.
28. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT].
29. SURREY, supra note 15, at 112-13.
30. See 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 21, acq. in Manuel Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966). The
taxpayer can take depreciation deductions greater than his original investment.
31. I.R.C. §163; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17203.
32. Andrews, A Consumption-Type Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1138-
39 (1974).
1977 / Tax Shelters
savings could more than equal the net investment.33 Thus the taxpayer can
maximize the benefit of deferral by incurring deductible expenditures in
excess of his equity investment.34 Leverage, however, does not cause the
value of conversion to increase. Instead, the value of conversion decreases
as leverage increases the rate of return to the taxpayer because conversion
has the effect of requiring the taxpayer to pay only one-half of the tax
previously deferred. 35
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
As a guide to potential California tax reform measures, an analysis of the
House proposal and the Tax Reform Act of 197636 is instructive. The
approaches taken by the House and the Act are similar in some respects but
are substantially different in others. Basically, the House relied on the
limitation on artificial losses (LAL) provision to curb the abuses of tax
shelters, 37 while the Act relies on significantly revised minimum tax 38 and
maximum tax provisions, 39 the "at risk" limitation on losses, 4°
strengthened depreciation recapture rules, 4 1 and a provision aimed at farm-
ing syndicates. 42 This section will discuss these approaches and their effect
on real estate and farming tax shelters.
A. House Proposal
1. Explanation of the LAL
The limitation on artificial losses would have applied to real estate,
farming, and other tax shelter investments.43 In the case of real estate, the
LAL would have provided that accelerated deductions attributable to real
property that exceed a taxpayer's net related income from real property
would not be deductible in the taxable year in which they are incurred. 44 The
accelerated deductions in excess of the taxpayer's net related income would
have been deferred either until the taxpayer had received net related income
in a subsequent year, or had disposed of the property. 45 The term "acceler-
ated deduction" includes interest, real property taxes during the construc-
tion period, and accelerated depreciation. 6 Net related income consists of
33. Id.
34. SURREY, supra note 15, at 112.
35. McKee, supra note 22, at 546.
36. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
37. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101(a) (1975). The Tax Reform Act of 1975 was
passed by the House of Representatives on December 4, 1975.
38. I.R.C. §§56, 58.
39. I.R.C. §1348.
40. I.R.C. §465.
41. I.R.C. §1250.
42. I.R.C. §§278, 464.
43. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101(a) (1975).
44. Id.
45. Id. The accelerated deductions that are deferred are placed in the taxpayer's deferred
deduction account. The taxpayer would be required to keep detailed records over many years in
order to account for the accelerated deductions that have been deferred.
46. Id. The taxpayer can capitalize construction period interest and real property taxes,
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the gross income from the property less the ordinary deductions47 attribut-
able to the property.48
The bill treated the taxpayer's real property as a class rather than separate-
ly in calculating whether an excess of accelerated deductions over net
related income existed. 49 Thus, gross income from the class would include
rents, gains from the sale of all real property within the class, and fees
earned with respect to real estate management. 50 However, where the
non-accelerated deductions exceeded gross income for a separate item of
property, the economic loss thus incurred would not have reduced the net
related income for the class under the LAL. 51
The operation of the LAL with respect to farming would have been
similar to that provided for real property. 52 Accordingly, the accelerated
deductions allowable in one taxable period could not have exceeded the net
related income for that period. However, the bill would have allowed an
individual to offset a limited amount of accelerated deductions against his
non-farm income, if such income did not exceed $40,000. 53
The amount of net related farm income would have been determined by
grouping the class of farm properties that had given rise to the accelerated
deductions. 54 Except for certain farm syndicates, all farm property would
have been treated as one class of property.5" The accelerated deductions for
farming include preproductive expenses, prepaid supplies, and accelerated
depreciation of property having a crop or yield after such property has
entered its productive periods. 56
After the accelerated deductions are calculated, net related income would
and they will not be considered to be accelerated deductions. Construction period interest is
interest on an obligation used to purchase real property to the extent the interest is attributable
to the construction period for the property. Real property taxes would be considered an
accelerated deduction when the taxes are attributable to the construction period. Id.
47. E.g., maintenance and repairs, utilities, and wages are ordinary deductions.
48. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101(a) (1975).
49. Id.
50. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 35. Gross income from the class would also include
interest on obligations secured by mortgages on real property and fees earned for real estate
brokerage activities. Id.
51. Id. at 34. The taxpayer must maintain adequate accounting records to qualify for this
treatment. There must be some record of the deductions attributable to each item of property.
Id.'
52. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101(a) (1975).
53. Id. Specifically, the limited offset against non-farm income would allow the taxpayer
to deduct in the current period a farm loss produced by accelerated deductions against the
non-farm income not in excess of $20,000. However, the amount of farm loss deductible against
non-farm income decreases from $20,000 by one dollar for each dollar of non-farm income
above $20,000. Therefore, the limited offset is not available to the taxpayer whose non-farm
income exceeds $40,000.
54. Id.
55. Id. Thus, income from one crop or farming activity is used to offset accelerated
deductions from another crop or farming activity. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 46.
56. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §101(a) (1975). Preproductive period expenses are
those costs attributable to crops, animals, trees, and other producing property incurred prior to
the period that the property becomes productive. Livestock other than poultry are expressly
excepted from this provision. Under the bill, prepaid feed is not considered an accelerated
deduction for those taxpayers who produce more than 50 percent of the feed consumed by the
taxpayer's livestock. Id.
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then be considered to determine the amount of accelerated deductions that
could be taken into account in a current taxable year. As in the case of real
property, the excess of the accelerated deductions over the net related
income would be placed into the taxpayer's deferred deduction account. 57 A
disposition of farm property would have caused a reduction in the deferred
deduction account equal to the amount that is attributable to such property. 58
Thus the amount previously deferred would then be deductible even if there
were an economic loss on the sale of the property.5 9 The deferred expenses
would also be deductible in a future taxable year when the taxpayer has net
related income. 60
The current statutory provisions enabling tax shelters to exist are not new
but have been used for many years to gain tax benefits. A major problem
today is the packaging of the various tax benefits by farming syndications
into interests which are then sold to investors who do not actively participate
in the management of the operation. This recent phenomenon has been a
catalyst for discontent over the ability of many to escape tax liability through
abuse of the tax system. 61 The House proposal treated syndicates differently
than other farming operations because syndicates are often formed primarily
for tax reasons. 62
Where a farming syndicate63 is involved, each activity begun during any
taxable year would have been designated a separate class for purposes of the
LAL. A farming syndicate may elect to use the accrual method of account-
ing64 and to capitalize preproductive expenses, thereby escaping the rule
that treats each activity as a separate class. 65 The House excepted from the
definition of "farming syndicate" the business association where a member
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. However, where a farming syndicate is concerned, all property attributable to any
one activity must be disposed of before any amount will be removed from the deferred
deduction account. Id.
60. Id.
61. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess., Overview of Tax Shelters 12, 18 (1975).
62. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 44.
63. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §101(a) (1975). A farming syndicate is defined in this
section as:(i) A partnership engaged in the trade or business of farming if at any time interests
in such partnership have been offered for sale in any offering required to be regis-
tered with a Federal or State agency having authority to regulate the offering of
securities for sale,
(ii) a partnership engaged in the trade or business of farming, if more than 50
percent of the losses during any period are allocable to limited partners, and(iii) any other enterprise engaged in the trade or business of farming if at any time
interests in such enterprise have been offered for sale in an offering described in
clause (i) or if the allocation of losses in such enterprise is similar to an allocation
described in clause (ii).
64. T. FIFLIS & R. KRIPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 36 (1971):
An important function of accounting principles to allocate items of expense (or costs)
and revenues to accounting periods and to obtain a proper matching thereof, regard-
less of when the cash expenditures or receipts occur or when obligations to pay or
rights to receive cash arise. This process of allocation is called accrual accounting. It
includes both the process of accrual and the process of deferral.
65. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. §101(a) (1975).
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had previously participated actively in the management of the business. 66 It
was believed that if a person was involved in the management of the
enterprise, then it is less likely that he participated in the syndicate solely for
tax shelter purposes. 67
In summary, the LAL would have limited the amount of accelerated
deductions currently deductible to the amount of net related income for that
year. The deductions in excess of net related income would have been
deferred and placed in a deferred deduction account until the taxpayer either
had net related income in a subsequent year or disposed of the property.
2. Analysis of the LAL
The LAL was intended to limit tax shelters significantly. 68 The provision
would substantially affect the continued existence of the benefits of tax
shelters. Under the LAL, the ability to gain the benefits of tax deferral
would be curtailed by the elimination of the deductibility of losses caused by
accelerated deductions against non-shelter income. The accelerated deduc-
tions would be required to match the corresponding income. 69 The main
emphasis of the LAL as proposed by the House is the elimination of the
deferral benefit. 70 The LAL, however, would not limit the deferral of tax
that resulted from expenses that do not represent accelerated deductions. 71
Also, the taxpayer would still be able to defer taxes on the current operating
income from the investment. 72 The benefits of conversion would also be
lessened by decreasing the deductions that could be used to offset ordinary
income.
The LAL would have substantial impact on the leverage benefit because
of the limitations on the deductibility of construction period interest. Lever-
aged investments are dependent on the current deductibility of interest. Thus
adoption of the LAL provision would have substantial effect upon all three
characteristics of tax shelters-deferral, conversion, and leverage.
Despite its advantages, the LAL has been attacked for its complexity and
its adverse economic impact.73 Many commentators believe that simplicity
is a major consideration in any tax reform legislation, 74 and the House itself
has recognized the serious problem of complexity in the tax system. 75 The
66. Id. The exception provides that where a farming enterprise would be classified a
farming syndicate because of a more than 50 percent loss allocation to limited partners or other
passive parties, the loss allocations will not be treated as made to such parties where a person
had previously actively participated in the management of the business.
67. HousE REPORT, supra note 28, at 48.
68, Id. at 9.
69. McDaniel, supra note 5, at 853.
70. Bacon, Legislative Outlook for Shelters, in U.S. CAL. 1975 TAx INST. 618 (1975).
71. Id. at 619.
72. Id.
73. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) [here! iafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
74. See Hall, Our Tax Structure: Personal Observations, in U.S SAL. 1974 TAx INST. 1007
(1974).
75. House REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
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LAL necessitates that the taxpayer keep records over a long period of years
in order to account for his deferred deductions. In addition, the taxpayer
would be required to keep records in order to differentiate net related income
from other income. Arguably, the LAL would only add to the already overly
complicated tax system.76
Another major criticism of the LAL is the adverse effect that it would
have on the economy. Critics contend that the LAL fails to distinguish
between the actual abuses of tax shelters, where economically inefficient
investments are undertaken purely for tax reasons, and the use of tax
incentives which provide important encouragement to economically worth-
while investments. 77 The Senate Finance Committee believed that by disal-
lowing the deductions for both beneficial and detrimental investments, the
LAL would prevent the economically worthwhile productive business from
existing. 78 Thus, the House approach of the LAL could be very detrimental
in circumstances of high unemployment and housing shortage, where tax
incentives are crucial to the continued existence of many businesses. 7 9
These criticisms may be answered by the response that the LAL would
still allow the taxpayer to deduct his investment expenses from the invest-
ment's profit, thus providing a continuing incentive to invest in high risk
investments. 80 The taxpayer who is already involved in an activity would
not be affected significantly by the limitation on artificial losses.8 The LAL
permits a taxpayer to aggregate all the income from related investments,
thus enabling the investor to deduct any accelerated deduction from a recent
investment against the current related income from an older investment. 82
Therefore, the only taxpayers who may be dissuaded from investing because
of the LAL are those who have no current investments in the particular
activity. Thus it appears that the LAL would effectively deter many of the
abuses associated with tax shelters, while still providing needed incentives
to established investors.
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
Congress eventually rejected the LAL and adopted the Senate proposal in
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. In the Act, Congress has included an "at risk"
limitation on losses, 83 provided a section directly affecting the availability of
certain tax benefits to farming syndicates, 84 strengthened the minimum85
76. Corman, The Use and Misuse of Tax Shelters: The Congress and Tax Reforms, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 509, 520 (1974).
77. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 39.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Proposals for Tax Change, 21 FED. TAXES REP. BULL. (P-H) 11 (May 3, 1973).
81. Id.
82. Comment, Limitation on Artificial Accounting Losses (LAL): Another Assault on the
Tax Shelter, 5 ST. MARYS' L.J. 586, 589 (1973). See also Hardymon, The Real Estate Venture
As A Tax Shelter, 51 N.C.L. REV. 735, 737-38 (1973).
83. I.R.C. §465.
84. I.R.C. §§278, 464.
85. I.R.C. §§56, 58.
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and maximum tax86 provisions, and widened the scope of the depreciation
recapture rules. 87 These provisions must be considered as a package, and not
as separate and distinct proposals, because each provision is directed to a
different part of the tax shelter problem.
1. The "At Risk" Limitation on Losses
a. Explanation
Under the provisions of the Act, the amount of any loss that may be
deducted in connection with farming activities cannot exceed the aggregate
amount with respect to which the taxpayer is "at risk" in each such activity
at the close of the taxable year. 88 The taxpayer will be considered to be "at
risk" to the extent of his cash and the adjusted basis 89 of other property
contributed to the farming investment, as well as any amounts borrowed for
use in the investment with respect to which the taxpayer has personal
liability for payment. 90 The taxpayer will not be found to be "at risk" with
respect to the proceeds from any nonrecourse loan91 used to finance the
operation or the acquisition of property used in the investment. 92 Of course,
any loan where the lender's only recourse is the taxpayer's interest in the
investment does not increase the taxpayer's amount "at risk. " 93 However,
the taxpayer is "at risk" to the extent of the fair market value of personal
assets that secure nonrecourse loans.94
The amount of any loss which is allowed as a deduction in a particular
year reduces the amount "at risk." ' 95 A loss in excess of the taxpayer's "at
risk" amount will be disallowed and will not be allowed in a subsequent
year unless the taxpayer increases his "at risk" amount. 96 Thus, the tax-
payer will be able to deduct previously disallowed losses only to the extent
that his amount "at risk" is increased in later years.
The House bill also included an "at risk" limitation on losses that dealt
with certain farming operations, but the provision applied only to livestock
operations and certain crops. 97 The Senate broadened the application of the
"at risk" limitation so that it would serve as the primary limitation on the
tax benefits available to taxpayers who are involved in farming operations. 98
This broadening appears necessary in light of the deletion of the LAL
86. I.R.C. §1348.
87. I.R.C. §1250.
88. I.R.C. §465(a).
89. See I.R.C. §§1011-1024.
90. I.R.C. §465(b).
91. A nonrecourse loan is one on which the taxpayer has no personal liability for repay-
ment. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 47.
92. I.R.C. §465(b).
93. I.R.C. §465(b).
94. I.R.C. §465(b).
95. I.R.C. §465(b).
96. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 48.
97. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §207 (1975).
98. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 63-64.
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proposal, 99 which was intended by the House to be the overall limitation on
the tax benefits in farming." Real estate is not included among the ac-
tivities to which the "at risk" limitation is applicable. 10 1 The "at risk"
limitation on farming losses will apply to all taxpayers except corporations
which are not subchapter S corporations.12 The provision applies regardless
of the accounting method used °3 and the kind of expenses which contrib-
uted to the loss."° For an individual, each farm is considered a separate
activity,' and whether an individual is engaged in one or more farming
activities is determined by examining all the facts and circumstances. 0 6
Where a partnership or subchapter S corporation is involved, however, all
farming activities are treated as one activity. 10 7
The "at risk" provision was included in the Act to prevent an investor
from deducting losses in a single taxable year which are greater than the
amount he could ultimately lose with respect to his investment. Even though
a provision dealing specifically with farming syndicates is included in the
Act, 108 the "at risk" limitation is necessary because not all farming tax
shelters are syndicates. It will prevent leveraging of tax shelter benefits
through the use of nonrecourse loans. 109
b. Analysis
The "at risk" limitation on farming losses was designed to limit abuses
occurring through tax shelters by the use of limited risk financing. 110 It is
contended that this provision deals more directly with the abuses than the
LAL proposal."' Allowing the taxpayer to include amounts representing
nonrecourse loans in his basis is a major problem in tax shelters, because
investors are able to use nonrecourse leveraging to produce tax savings
greater than the amounts for which the taxpayers are personally liable. 11
2
One result of the availability of this leveraging technique is a distortion of
the choices available in the market place, thereby resulting in the investment
99. Id.
100. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 9.
101. I.R.C. §465(c).
102. I.R.C. §465(a).
103. I.R.C. §465.
104. I.R.C. §465.
105. I.R.C. §465(c).
106. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 63. The facts and circumstances that the Senate
Finance Committee believes to be relevant are:
the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of various activities in
which the taxpayer is engaged, the business purpose which is (or might be) served by
carrying on the various activities separately or together, and the similarity of the
various activities. Id.
107. I.R.C. §465(c).
108. I.R.C. §§278, 464. See text accompanying notes 119-134 infra.
109. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 63-64.
110. Id. at 47.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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of capital in economically unsound projects." 3
The "at risk" limitation will substantially limit the tax benefits provided
by nonrecourse financing. However, the taxpayer will still be able to deduct
an amount equal to his equity against his non-shelter income. Thus, the
ability to defer taxes is not totally eliminated where recourse loans are
involved. Also, the Senate Finance Committee Report has suggested one
possible approach to obtaining the benefits of nonrecourse financing. 114 The
Report indicates that a taxpayer will be "at risk" while he is personally
liable on the debt, but will cease to be "at risk" if the loan becomes a
nonrecourse debt. 5 The taxpayer could claim large losses at the beginning
of the investment when he has a sufficient amount "at risk" and then
eliminate his personal liability by converting the obligation into a non-
recourse debt. 116 Consequently at least one loophole may exist in the
provision.
It appears that the "at risk" provision will force investors to look more
closely at the alternatives in the investment market. No longer will the
seeker of the tax write-off be able to invest leisurely in highly-leveraged
ventures, knowing that the tax savings will more than offset any loss of the
original investment. Of course, it appears that the proposal has no effect on
the deductibility of losses where the taxpayer is personally liable on the
debt. Thus, the leverage aspect of farming tax shelters is not eliminated,
although the nonrecourse type of leverage seems to be extinguished. One
collateral effect of the "at risk" limitation could be a decrease in the
demand for loans. As the demand decreases, assuming demand and interest
rates have an elastic relationship," 7 the interest rates available to investors
will decrease, thus giving the investor who is willing to risk personal
liability on loans a greater opportunity to benefit from leverage.1 8
2. Farming Syndicates Provision
a. Explanation
Another significant provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 concerns
farming syndicates. This section requires farming syndicates to capitalize
expenses incurred for planting, cultivation, maintenance, and development,
and to deduct expenses for farm supplies only when consumed. 119
113. See Surrey, Tax Incentives As A Device For Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705, 725 (1970).
114. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 48 n.1.
115. Id.
116. Reisman & Taub, Effect of New Law on Tax Shelters, 5 TAX. FOR LAW. 196, 198
(1977).
117. See P. SAMUELSON. ECONOMiCs 380 (9th ed. 1973), stating that elasticity of demand
indicates the "degree of responsiveness of Q demanded to changes in market P." Where an
elastic relationship exists, a decrease in demand would have a corresponding effect on price or
interest rates as in this case.
118. McKee, supra note 22, at 537.
119. I.R.C. §§278, 464.
1977 / Tax Shelters
Prior law allowed farming syndicates to benefit from the special tax rules,
used by those actively engaged in farm operations, that permitted a current
deduction for most of the costs of raising animals or growing crops. 120 Also,
many types of improvements to farm property may be deducted currently
rather than capitalized. 121 The opportunities for deferral will be significantly
reduced by the farming syndicates provision in the Act.
The capitalization requirement in the Act applies to those expenses
incurred prior to the taxable year in which the grove, orchard, or vineyard
began to produce crops in commercial quantities. 122 This provision does not
apply to forestry or the growing of timber. 123 The Act has excepted from the
farming syndicate provision certain enterprises where a member of the
business had previously participated actively in the management of the farm
operation. 124 It is intended that only the passive investor not be allowed to
benefit from the beneficial farming rules.
b. Analysis
The "at risk" limitation on farming losses, 12 when joined with the
farming syndicate provision, 126 places great obstacles in the path of the
potential abuser of the tax system. Requiring farming syndicates to adopt the
accrual method of accounting for farm supplies will end the practice of
reporting such expenses on the cash method. Prior law did not require the
syndicate to capitalize or inventory expenditures that would normally be
accorded such accounting treatment; 127 thus the deductions for those ex-
penditures were accelerated and tax deferral occurred. 128 However, under
this provision, farming syndicates will have to conform to the practices
already observed in nonfarming operations, 129 thus reducing the oppor-
tunities for deferral to occur.
The main thrust of the provision is to limit the deferral benefit. 130 It will
substantially eliminate the accelerated deductions which provide for the
120. Treas. Reg. §1.162-12(a) (1972). CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17235 requires that certain
development costs of fruit and nut groves be capitalized.
121. E.g., I.R.C. §175; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §17224.
122. I.R.C. §278(b).
123. I.R.C. §278(b).
124. I.R.C. §464(c). In this section, Congress has defined farming syndicates to include:
(A) a partnership or any other enterprise other than a corporation which is not an
electing small business corporation (as defined in section 1371(b)) engaged in the
trade or business of farming, if at any time interests in such partnership or enterprise
have been offered for sale in any offering required to be registered with any Federal
or any State agency having authority to regulate the offering of securities for sale, or
(B) a partnership or any other enterprise other than a corporation which is not an
electing small business corporation (as defined in section 1371(b)) engaged in the
trade or business of farming, if more than 35 percent of the losses during any period
are allocable to limited partners or limited entrepreneurs.
125. See text accompanying notes 87-108 supra.
126. I.R.C. §§278, 464.
127. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 52.
128. See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra.
129. See I.R.C. §§278, 464.
130. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 56.
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deferral of taxes on non-farm income.131 For non-syndicate farmers, it was
apparently believed that the simplicity of the prior law justified the con-
tinuance of the special farm provisions. 132
The syndicate farmer will be more affected by the farming syndicate
provision in the Tax Reform Act than he would have been by the House
proposed LAL. While the LAL would have limited the deductibility of
accelerated deductions, the farming syndicate provision appears to be a
more direct limitation on the use of the provisions which enable farming
syndicate tax shelters to exist. Also, this limitation appears to be superior in
another respect. By definition, the syndicate rules do not apply where there
is active participation in the management of the farming enterprise; 133 the
passive investor is the only one affected. There is a general feeling that the
true farmer should be treated differently from the investor looking for tax
advantages.134 However, the active farmer who has substantial amounts of
nonfarm income and attempts to use the farming operation as a tax shelter
will still be subject to the "at risk" limitation on losses. Thus the "at risk"
provision will be especially important where the farming syndicate section is
not applicable and nonrecourse financing is used.
3. Depreciation Recapture Provisions
a. Explanation
Another important provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 relates to
depreciation recapture on the sale of real property. 135 Under federal law, all
post-1969 and pre-1976 depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation
is recaptured to the extent of gain when the property is sold. 136 For residen-
tial property, however, the amount of post-1969 and pre-1976 depreciation
in excess of straight-line depreciation which is recaptured is reduced by one
percent for each month the property is held over 20 months. 137
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, when residential property is sold, to
the extent of gain recognized on the sale, all depreciation in excess of
straight-line depreciation is recaptured. 38 There is full recapture of all
depreciation, straight-line and the amount in excess of straight-line, when
the property is not held for more than 12 months.' 39
131. Davenport, A Bountiful Tax Harvest, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1969).
132. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 52.
133. I.R.C. §464(c).
134. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 57.
135. I.R.C. §1250.
136. I.R.C. §1250(a).
137. I.R.C. §1250(a). CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §18212 was amended in 1971 to conform to
I.R.C. §1250. The California amendments apply to post-1970 excess depreciation while §1250
applies to post-1969 excess depreciation. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §18212.
138. I.R.C. §1250(a).
139. I.R.C. §1250(b); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §18212.
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b. Analysis
By broadening the scope of the depreciation recapture provisions, Con-
gress has reduced the benefits of conversion. 14° Increasing the amount of
depreciation that is recaptured as ordinary income decreases the amount of
gain treated as a capital gain, thus limiting the operation of conversion.
4. The Minimum Tax
a. Explanation
A significant change to the tax law contained in the Tax Reform Act of
1976 concerns the minimum tax for individuals. 141 Prior federal law im-
posed a minimum tax on certain tax preferences.142 The items classified as
tax preferences included: (1) accelerated depreciation on real property in
excess of straight-line depreciation; (2) accelerated depreciation on personal
property subject to a net lease; and (3) the untaxed half of capital gains. 143
The minimum tax is designed to limit the ability of taxpayers to completely
escape their tax liability by combining tax preferences. 144
Under prior law, the tax amounted to ten percent of the sum of the tax
preferences in excess of a $30,000 exemption and the taxpayer's income
tax. 145 Both prior and current federal law provide that the minimum tax be
added to the taxpayer's income tax to determine the total amount that he will
pay.
The Tax Reform Act made various changes to the prior law, including
increasing the rate of the minimum tax from ten percent to 15 percent, 146
lowering the $30,000 exemption to $10,000 or one-half of the regular
income tax liability, whichever is greater,147 and deleting the deduction for
regular federal income taxes paid. 148 These changes are intended to increase
the tax burden of taxpayers who attempt to avoid paying their share of taxes
through the use of tax preference items.
b. Analysis
The minimum tax provision contained in the Tax Reform Act has been
criticized as being overly complex and not directly attacking the basic
problem of tax avoidance. 149 The purpose of the minimum tax is to allow the
current tax incentives to remain intact while simultaneously limiting the
existing tax shelter abuses by preventing investors from combining tax
140. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
141. I.R.C. §§56, 58.
142. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §301, 83 Stat. 580 (1969).
143. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §301(a), 83 Stat. 581 (1969).
144. See I.R.C. §§56-58.
145. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §301(a), 83 Stat. 580 (1969).
146. I.R.C. §56(a).
147. I.R.C. §56(a).
148. See I.R.C. §56(a).
149. Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1976, at 10, col. 3.
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preferences to escape their tax liability. This is accomplished through the
use of a tax on those preferences which exceed the statutory exemption. 50
Attaining the goal envisioned for the minimum tax required that the pre-
existing federal minimum tax be substantially strengthened by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976.151 Prior law had little impact because of the law's
narrow reach and large exemption. 152
The revision of the $30,000 exemption and federal income tax deduction
provisions and the increased minimum tax rate are intended to increase the
effective rate of minimum tax on the individual's tax preferred income.15 3
These changes will undoubtedly have such an effect. The tax system will be
more equitable by reducing the opportunities for tax avoidance. 154 Also the
deterrent effect of the minimum tax provisions cannot be underestimated.
There will be many who, for the first time, will be deterred from using tax
preferences because changes in the law may cause tax shelters which were
once attractive to investors to lose their appealing quality. An increase in the
amount of tax that an investor must pay because of strengthened minimum
tax provisions could substantially reduce the tax benefits provided by tax
preferences, thus decreasing the number of investments in tax shelters.15 5
5. The Maximum Tax
a. Explanation
Federal law provides that income from personal services will be taxed at a
maximum marginal tax rate of 50 percent. '5 6 Wages, salaries, and compen-
sation for personal services, and a reasonable amount of net profits from a
business where both personal services and capital produce income are
considered income from personal services. 157 The amount eligible for the
maximum marginal rate is reduced by certain deductions to reach the final
amount that is subject to the maximum rate. 158
Although the House did not include any changes to the maximum tax in
the original bill, 159 the Tax Reform Act of 1976 does contain revisions to the
maximum tax, including a provision that will reduce the amount of personal
service income subject to the maximum tax by the total amount of the
taxpayer's tax preferences as determined under the minimum tax provi-
150. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 110.
151. McDaniel, supra note 5, at 840.
152. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 90-172, §301(a), 83 Stat. 580 (1969).
153. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 110.
154. Id. at 109.
155. An important revision to the minimum tax was deleted from the final version of the
legislation. A Senate Finance Committee amendment would have added construction period
interest and excess investment interest to the list of tax preferences. This change, however, was
rendered unnecessary by the inclusion in the Act of sections that deal directly with construction
period interest and excess investment interest. See I.R.C. §§163(d), 189.
156. I.R.C. §1348.
157. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 114. See I.R.C. §1348(b).
158. I.R.C. §1348(b).
159. See H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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sion. 160 Prior law had allowed the taxpayer a $30,000 preference exemption
before tax preferences would reduce the amount of income subject to the 50
percent marginal rate.1 61 Thus the total amount of tax preference items,
rather than the amount above $30,000, will reduce the amount of personal
service income that will be taxed at the 50 percent marginal rate.
b. Analysis
One purpose of the maximum tax was to discourage the use of tax
shelters. 162 By limiting the marginal rate of tax on personal service income
to 50 percent, instead of subjecting such income to the regular income tax
rates where the maximum marginal rate is 70 percent, it was believed that
upper bracket taxpayers would save their money rather than invest in tax
shelters. 163 The maximum tax, however, has not been effective in deterring
the use of tax shelters. 164
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 will make tax shelters somewhat less
inviting by the deletion of the $30,000 tax preference exemption. The
taxpayer who qualifies for the maximum tax will find that each dollar of tax
preference will result in one dollar of personal service income being taxed at
marginal income tax rates that could be as high as 70 percent. The taxpayer,
therefore, will be more likely to be discouraged from using tax prefer-
ences. 
16 5
This review of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 leads to the conclusion that
future abuses of the tax system will be reduced. The revised minimum and
maximum tax provisions along with the "at risk" limitation on losses, the
farming syndicate provision, and the broadened depreciation recapture pro-
vision will substantially limit the opportunities for tax-avoidance and result
in a more equitable tax system. These provisions are superior to the limita-
tion on artificial losses proposal of the House which was far more compli-
cated and fraught with adverse economic consequences.
ALTERNATIVES FOR CALIFORNIA
California is faced with the decision of whether to amend or add to its tax
law in light of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. A review of existing California
law is necessary before a recommendation of future legislation can be
forthcoming.
A. Current California Law
California tax law is patterned after federal law. Thus the impact of the
160. See I.R.C. §57.
161. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §804(a), 83 Stat. 685 (1969).
162. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 115.
163. Id.
:64. Id.
165. Id.
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changes resulting from the adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 in
California would be almost identical to the impact of the Act on prior federal
law. Various provisions in the California Revenue and Taxation Code allow
farming and real estate tax shelters similar to those available under federal
law to exist in California.
1. Deferral
California law is almost identical to federal law with respect to the
accelerated depreciation methods that an investor can use.166 Accelerated
depreciation is one type of deduction that enables the taxpayer to defer his
income tax liability to a later period. In addition, the Californian who
invests in a farming operation can deduct currently certain costs that would
normally be capitalized or accrued under recognized financial accounting
standards. For example, amounts expended for soil and water conservation
can be deducted in the year paid even though the expenditure increases the
value of the land or has an effectiveness longer than one year. 167 Develop-
ment expenses incurred before the farming operation becomes operative are
also currently deductible. 168 California does, however, require that certain
development costs of fruit and nut groves be capitalized. 169
2. Conversion
The availability of capital gains treatment upon the sale or other disposi-
tion of an asset in California enables conversion to occur. California law
provides that a sale of property used in a trade or business will be subject to
the more favorable capital gains treatment. 170 However, the Code, as in the
federal law, includes provisions that require the taxpayer to treat a gain on
the disposition of an asset as ordinary income to the extent of the accelerated
depreciation allowed in the case of real property' 7 ' and to the extent of
expenditures previously deducted for soil conservation or the prevention of
erosion where a sale of farming property is involved. 172 These recapture
provisions limit but do not preclude the opportunity for conversion to occur.
3. Leverage
The tax benefits associated with leverage can also be obtained in Califor-
nia. The taxpayer is allowed to deduct interest expense in arriving at taxable
income. "I Moreover, the obligation on which the interest is paid is included
166. See I.R.C. §167; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17208-17210. See text accompanying notes
16-27 supra.
167. I.R.C. §175; CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §17224.
168. I.R.C. §162; Treas. Reg. §1.162-12 (1972); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17202-17202.3.
169. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §17235.
170. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§18181-18182.
171. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§18212-18218.
172. CAL. REV. & TA. CODE § 18219.
173. CAL. REV. & TA. CODE §17203.
1977 / Tax Shelters
in the taxpayer's basis in determining the amount subject to depreciation. 174
The deductibility of interest and the ability to include the amount of the debt
in the asset's basis allows the investor to gain the greatest tax benefit from
leverage.
Under California law, therefore, as with federal law, the three character-
istics of tax shelters appear and provide the opportunities for tax avoidance.
The rules providing for the recapture of depreciation and soil conservation
expenses, and the provisions requiring the capitalization of certain expendi-
tures are examples of California law that currently attempt to limit the
abuses associated with tax shelters.
B. Recommendation for California
California is not required to follow the changes to the tax law made by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.175 The complexity of the tax law, however, does
make consistency in the law desirable when feasible. There should be
serious consideration of the following recommendations not only for the
reason of consistency, but also because of the need to limit the operation of
tax avoidance devices in Calfornia.
1. Limitation on Artifical Losses
Adoption of a provision such as the LAL would have a substantial impact
upon leverage, deferral, and conversion. 176 However, rejection of the LAL
is recommended because it would place the taxpayer beginning a new
business at a disadvantage due to the provision that requires the taxpayer to
aggregate his properties in determining related income. 177 It would not
significantly affect the taxpayer already involved in an activity. The begin-
ning entrepreneur would be required to pay taxes on his invested capital
while attempting to compete with established businesses. 17 Unless the
taxpayer has the benefit of the current tax incentives, he cannot compete
with the established competition. Since the tax system is intended to be
equitable, the LAL would not further equity because it would place a greater
burden on the new businessman. In addition, the complexity of the LAL is
another factor that supports rejection of the proposal. Thus the complexity
of the LAL, its bias against the new businessman, and its failure to distin-
guish between legitimate attempts to operate economically successful
businesses and investment schemes seeking tax losses indicate that the LAL
should be rejected. 179
174. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17211, 18041-18042; 18 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §18042.
175. See Coast Elevator Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 44 Cal. App. 3d 576, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 818 (1975).
176. See text accompanying notes 15-35 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 43-82 supra.
178. Comment, Limitation on Artificial Accounting Losses (LAL): AnotherAssault on the
Tax Shelter, 5 ST. MARYs' L.J. 586, 609 (1973).
179. See text accompanying notes 43-82 supra.
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2. The "At Risk" Limitation on Losses
Investors are able to use nonrecourse leveraging to produce tax savings
greater than the amounts for which they are personally liable. 80 There are
no limitations on the use of nonrecourse financing in California. The "at
risk" limitation on farming losses would be a substantial improvement of
current law. The abuses associated with nonrecourse financing would be
eliminated, and concomitant with this change would be an increased aware-
ness on the part of the investing public of investment risks because of the use
of loan proceeds on which there would be personal liability for repayment.
Thus, there would be a decrease in the number of unsound investment
projects and a limitation on one of the most substantial abusese in our tax
system, nonrecourse leveraging.
3. Farming Syndicates
Past abuses of the tax incentive provisions evidence a reasonable basis for
making the distinction between the syndicate and nonsyndicate farmer. 18'
California makes no such distinction in its tax system. Farming syndicates
have enabled passive investors to benefit from the tax incentives intended to
benefit only those actively involved in farming. 82 Requiring farming syndi-
cates to capitalize certain expenditures and use the accrual method of
accounting would significantly reduce tax deferral. 83 Consequently,
California should consider adopting a similar provision.
4. Depreciation Recapture
Under California law, the amount of depreciation recaptured on the sale
of residential property is reduced by an amount determined by the number of
years that the property was owned. 184 As the amount of gain that is recap-
tured decreases, the amount subject to favorable capital gains treatment
increases, thus enabling conversion to occur. 185 Total recapture of the
excess of the accelerated depreciation over the striaght-line depreciation
would reduce the opportunities to benefit from conversion. California,
therefore, should follow federal law and provide for full recapture. 186
5. The Minimum Tax
California has already made significant changes in its minimum tax. In
1975, two major amendments were enacted: (1) the two and one-half
percent rate of tax imposed on tax preferences was replaced with a progres-
180. See text accompanying notes 88-118 supra.
181. See text accompanying notes 119-134 supra.
182. See McDaniel, supra note 5, at 822-26.
183. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
184. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§18212-18218.
185. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
186. See text accompanying notes 135-140 supra.
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sive rate that ranges from one-half percent to five and one-half percent;1 17
and, (2) the previously existing $30,000 exemption was reduced to $4000
for a single person and $8000 for a married couple. 188
In adopting the progressive rate structure, California followed the sugges-
tions of some commentators that a progressive rate system be substituted for
the flat rate structure. 189 Congress rejected the progressive approach in favor
of the flat rate because the progressive rate was believed to be more
complex, with such increased complexity outweighing any contended
benefits. 190
California's approach decreases the effectiveness of the minimum tax on
those taxpayers who are at the lower levels of the progressive rate. Of
course, these taxpayers at the lower levels had never been subject to the
minimum tax under the $30,000 exemption provision. With the lower
exemption, a married taxpayer with $9000 of tax preferences will pay an
additional five dollars in state income tax. 191 Realistically, the extra five
dollars in tax will not affect the taxpayer's investment decision-making
process. Thus, the progressive rate of California is not ineffective per se,
but, rather, the tax rate at the lower amounts of tax preferences is too low to
have any significant impact on the investor or to make any meaningful
contribution to the state's treasury. Therefore, it appears that the rates at the
lower levels of the rate scale should be increased to at least the two and
one-half percent level that existed prior to the 1973 revision.
The California minimum tax exemption is comparable to the exemption
provided in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. It apparently would not be feasible
in California to follow federal law and provide for an alternative exemption
of one-half of the state income tax paid since state income tax rates are
substantially lower than federal income tax rates. 192 Therefore, the Califor-
nia minimum tax exemption should not be changed in light of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. The only apparent weakness in California minimum
tax is the low tax rates at the bottom end of the tax rate scale.
6. The Maximum Tax
One purpose of the maximum tax is to deter investments which are
intended to shelter income that would be taxed at rates above 50 percent. 193
California does not have a maximum tax provision. The apparent justifica-
tion for the absence of such a provision is the inherent difference that exists
187. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17062-17062.2.
188. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§17062-17062.2.
189. SURREY, supra note 15, at 405-46 & n.67.
190. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 130-31.
191. This five dollar figure is arrived at by subtracting the $8000 exemption from $9000,
and multiplying the remaining $1000 by one-half of one percent.
192. The maximum regular income tax rate in California is 11 percent. CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §17041.
193. SENATE REPORT, supra note 73, at 115.
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in the federal and state income tax rate structures. The maximum California
tax rate of 11 percent begins at $31,000 of taxable income,194 while the
maximum federal rate of 70 percent does not begin until taxable income
reaches the $200,000 level, 195 and the 50 percent income tax bracket begins
at $44,000 of taxable income. 196 Thus, the maximum California income tax
rate is applied at a taxable income level lower than that at which the
favorable federal maximum tax rate is applied. Moreover, the taxpayer who
is intended to be deterred from using tax shelters by the maximum tax
provision usually has a taxable income figure substantially in excess of
$31,000, the amount where the maximum California income tax rate begins.
Consequently, the narrow range of tax rates in California, in conjunction
with the maximum rate applied at a relatively low level of taxable income
would appear to preclude the operation of a maximum tax in California.
CONCLUSION
The citizenry is becoming more aware of those taxpayers who comprise
the upper-income stratum of the population and of their attempts to reduce
their income tax liability through investments in tax shelters. Prior attempts
at tax reform have not solved the problem of tax shelters and the abuses that
accompany them. In response to this continuing problem, Congress enacted
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. This legislation contains many provisions
dealing with tax shelters, some of which should be considered by the
California Legislature.
California tax law, similar to prior federal law in many important re-
spects, contains various provisions which enable tax shelters to exist and
prosper. Adoption of the "at risk" limitation on farming losses, the farming
syndicate provision, and a strengthened depreciation recapture provision
would significantly limit the current abuses while improving economic
efficiency and furthering the goal of equity in the tax system.
Gary G. Perry
194. CAL. REv. &TAX. CODE §17041.
195. I.R.C. §1.
196. I.R.C. §1.
